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Feeding the Permanently Unconscious and Terminally Ill or Dying Is Not
Always Compassion
Abstract

A surrogate decision maker may conclude that efforts to mechanically provide liquid nourishment would
cause considerable suffering in return for little gain. But such a decision is unquestionably one that can
produce great conflict for families and for medical caregivers. Assessment must be made of each patient's
situation and of the benefits and burdens that will result if tube feeding is withheld or withdrawn. It may well
be, however, that in some cases, the most humane and compassionate treatment for a patient is the withdrawal
of all technological interventions, including those that supply nourishment.
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FEEDING THE PERMANENTLY UNCONSCIOUS
OR DYING IS NOT ALWAYS COMPASSION
By Phebe S. Haugen

n March 3 Governor Rudy Perpich signed into law the Adult
Health Care Decisions Act,
_
making Minnesota the 39th state
to adopt a Living Will law. The statute
permits individuals to declare in advance
what medical treatment they would like in
the event they become incapable of communicating their preferences, and permits
the designation of a proxy to make healthcare decisions for a declarant.
The battle over the proposed law was
waged for six years. While a number of
provisions fueled the debate, none was as
controversial as the proposal to permit a
proxy decision to withdraw artificially administered nutrition and hydration from an
incompetent patient. The specter of patients who could no longer speak for
themselves being "starved to death" caused bitter opposition to the law. Special interest groups lobbied tirelessly against
what they viewed as the first step down
the slippery slope to active euthanasia.
Despite the opposition, the bill arrived
on the governor's desk with its basic provisions, including those permitting the
withdrawal of tube feeding, relatively
unencumbered by qualifications. Its critics
vow to return another day to try to protect
the most vulnerable from what they are
certain represents an inhumane abdication
of society's responsibility to give basic
care to the hopelessly ill.
Are these opponents of the living will
law correct in their understanding of what
it means to permit the withdrawal of ar-
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tificially administered nutrition and hydration? Many think not, although the subject
is not without controversy, even among
doctors. Where did it all start?
In 1976 the parents of Karen Ann
Quinlan went to court seeking permission
to remove the respirator that everyone
believed was keeping her alive. The
pUblicity generated by the Quinlans'
agonizing claim to the right to speak on
their daughter's behalf brought to the
public's attention the question of how

The specter of patients
who could no longer
speak for themselves
being "starved to death"
caused bitter
opposition to the law.
much treatment is enough for a patient in
a hopeless condition, and Who decides for
someone who can no longer speak for
herself?
Before the Quinlans brought the issue to
the front pages of the world's newspapers,
such questions were rarely considered by
anyone other than a patient's family in
consultation with her doctor. But it was
not unknown for a doctor and the family
of a hopelessly ill patient to meet, talk
quietly together, and determine that for
their patient, resuscitation would be
withheld in the event of cardiac arrest,
mechanical ventilation would not be
employed to assist breathing, and if
pneumonia developed, no antibiotics
would be administered to defeat it.
After several months of litigation, the
New Jersey Supreme Court granted the
Quinlans' petition and affirmed strongly
that patients and their families, not the
courts, should make medical treatment
decisions. In the 13 years since the

Quinlan decision, many other courts have
struggled with similar questions, and certain principles have been fmnly settled:
A competent adult has the right to refuse
medical treatment. Any medical intervention may be refused, no matter how
necessary to the patient's survival. Thus,
a patient with no kidney function can
refuse further dialysis treatments, and a
quadriplegic can insist on removal of the
ventilator that enables her to breathe and
the gastrostomy tube that supplies her
nutrition and hydration; This right of
autonomous decision is grounded in the
constitutional right to privacy and the
common law right to bodily selfdetermination.
A patient who lacks the ability to make
decisions has the same right as the competent patient to refuse treatment. In this
situation, the patient's family or guardian
exercises the right on the patient's behalf,
and the decision is made on either a
substituted-judgment or a best-interests
standard. When substituted judgment is
employed, the decision maker tries to
ascertain what the patient would have
wanted. If that is not possible, an effort is
made to determine the best interests of the
patient by balancing the burdens of continuing treatment against the benefits to be
gained by the intervention, and the
likelihood that the patient can return to
cognitive existence.
Despite problems with the application
of those standards, in virtually every case
where a family's decision to end treatment
has reached the courts, that decision has
been upheld. It has become commonplace
to disconnect mechanical ventilators from
the hopelessly ill. But what if what is
sought is the withdrawal of artificially administered nutrition and hydration? What
has become so clear in the case of
respirators is far less certain for tube
feeding.
As recently as 20 years ago, patient
malnutrition inevitably followed from
illnesses that made normal digestion difficult or impossible. Today's technol-
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ogies make it possible to give patients
thousands of calories per day of liquid
nutrients administered through plastic tubing. Since we can keep patients alive by
these means, must we always do so?
Though most courts that have grappled
with this question have ultimately upheld
the decision of a surrogate to discontinue
tube feedings, they have done so on differing theories and without clear guidelines.
Why is this such a difficult issue? For
many, the provision of liquid nutrition is
ordinary care, while mechanical ventilation, sophisticated cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation techniques, and even antibiotics are viewed as extraordinary and
therefore not mandatory.
Others see these latter interventions as
medical treatment, which may be
foregone if they are not beneficial or are
unduly burdensome for the patient, while
they view the provision of nutrition and
hydration as basic care which must always
be maintained.
The American Medical Association's
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
declared in its opinion on "withholding or
withdrawing life-prolonging medical
treatment;' issued in 1986, that artificially
or technologically supplied nutrition and
hydration are life prolonging medical
treatment and as such may be discontinued in proper cases. The Minnesota
Medical Association has agreed. Still, the
issue remains troubling and unsettled,
even among doctors.
The provision of food and water is of
great symbolic importance. For many it
carries religious significance as well.
When we share a meal, says author
Frederick Buechner, we meet at the level
of our most basic need. Joanne Lynn and
James F. Childress note in "Must Patients
Always Be Given Food and Water?" (13
Hastings Center Report 17, October 1983)
that the act of feeding communicates our
values in a profound way. We demonstrate
love, compassion, and concern when we
give food and drink to another. Feeding
the newborn is our first and most important act to nurture both the new life and
the relationship we have with it. It remains the primary means by which we
comfort and sustain the very young and
vulnerable.
Still, the mechanical provision of nutrition and hydration has little in common
with the symbol-laden act of sharing food
and water. There are two basic systems
through which such sustenance is provided. In one, liquids are administered
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through a naso-gastric tube from the nose
into the stomach or through a tube
surgically inserted into the stomach or intestine (gastrostomy or jejunostomy). In
the other, the fluids are delivered intravenously by peripheral catheter or
through a larger catheter inserted directly into a major vein in the chest. In all its
forms, the procedures are intrusive, often
uncomfortable, and carry some risks.
It is a fundamental ethical principle in
medicine that interventions that would
provide no benefit to a patient may be
withheld, and that if they have been
begun, they may be withdrawn at the
point when they no longer help. Are there
any situations in which we can say that the
mechanical provision of nutrition and
hydration is of no real benefit to a patient?
Lynn and Childress, among others, argue
that there are three situations when it is
ethically permissible to forego this intervention: when the procedure would be
futile to accomplish its goals, when a patient is permanently unconscious, and
when the procedures would be disproportionately burdensome.

Sometimes procedures
for providing food and
drink simply do more
harm than good.
In the first case, patients with certain
conditions, such as serious absorption
diseases, intestinal cancers, advanced
congestive heart failure, or severe and extensive bums will die of their conditions
no matter what is done. Efforts to provide
them with nutrients and liquids through
any of the means described above will
likely not be effective and may well cause
added suffering without any benefit.
The second case, that of permanently
unconscious patients, raises deep
philosophic questions for most commentators. The medical reality is that when
cognitive, sapient life is not possible, interventions that will maintain biological
life can be of no benefit to the patient.
There are, however, two lingering questions. Can we be certain that the unconsciousness really is permanent, and
will these patients suffer pain if their
nutrition and hydration are withdrawn?
Although the accurate diagnosis of per-

manent unconsciousness, and particularly
of the persistent vegetative state is a complicated and sophisticated problem, a
skilled neurologist can make the diagnosis
quite reliably today. New diagnostic tools
have added to the certainty with which the
condition can be identified. As to the problem of pain, the American Academy of
Neurology has taken the unequivocal
position that the experience of pain is a
function of consciousness and is not
possible without the integrated functioning of the cerebral cortex and the brain
stem, functioning that is absent in the permanently unconscious patient. (See
Amicus Curiae Brief, American
Academy of Neurology, fIled in Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 39
Mass 417, 4fJ7 N.E. 2d 626, 1986).
The third and perhaps the most difficult
case in which it has been argued that tube
feedings are of no benefit to a patient is
when the procedures would be disproportionately burdensome. Sometimes they
simply do more harm than good. For the
severely demented patient who must be
restrained to be "fed" in this way, the
whole process can be so terrifying as to
be cruel. For the end-stage cancer patient,
there is considerable evidence in the nursing and hospice literature that withdrawal
of fluids may actually be beneficial. (See,
for example, Zerwekh, "The Dehydration
Question" 13 Nursing 47, January 1983).
It often results in less nausea, less
pulmonary edema and less confusion.
This can mean far greater comfort for the
patient, especially when good nursing
care and adequate pain control are maintained. The deaths that follow in these
situations, usually within a few days, have
been reported by families to be peaceful.
In any of these situations, a surrogate
decisionmaker may well conclude that efforts to mechanically provide liquid
nourishment would cause considerable
suffering in return for little gain. But such
a decision is unquestionably one that can
produce great conflict for families and for
medical caregivers. Assessment must be
made of each patient's situation and of the
benefits and burdens that will result if
tube feeding is withheld or withdrawn. It
may well be, however, that in some cases,
the most humane and compassionate
treatment for a patient is the withdrawal
of all technological interventions, including those that supply nourishm~nt.
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